Journal of Political Science
Volume 32

Number 1

Article 4

November 2004

Civil Religion, Fundamentalism, and the Politics and Policies of
George W. Bush
Manfred Brocke

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Brocke, Manfred (2004) "Civil Religion, Fundamentalism, and the Politics and Policies of George W. Bush,"
Journal of Political Science: Vol. 32 : No. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol32/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact commons@coastal.edu.

Civil Religion, Fundamentalism ,
and the Politics and Policies of
George W. Bush
Manfre d Brocker

University of Cologne, Germany
Countl ess observers , especially in Europe , tend to view
the politics of George W. Bush as being strongly inspired
by Christian
"fundamentalism"
and powered by "missionary " zeal . This article examines the justice of such
an assessment. It comes to a different conclusion , arguing that in his speeches , the current President of the
Unit ed States mostly uses "civil religious " metaphors
and images, but rarely those of Christian denominations ;
that he only adopts the domestic policy agenda of his
party 's Christian Right wing where this seems expedient
on electoral grounds ; and that his foreign policy is based
on American security interests, and not on any "fundamentalist" dogmas .

hen the preparations for military intervention in Iraq
were in full swing, many church leaders in Europe
were heard to voice criticism of the course taken by
the US government. The head of the Protestant Church in Germany, Manfred Kock, described President George W. Bush as a
"religious fundamentalist" who gave the impression of believing
he had a religious mission to fulfill. "This kind ofrationale," said
Kock, "makes me terribly afraid." 1 The President of the Protestant Church in Hesse and Nassau, Peter Steinacker, viewed US
policy as an amalgamation of the battle against terrorism and a

W
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FrankfurterAllgemeine 'Zeitung,3 February 2003, p. 6.

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
VOLUME 32 2004 PAGES 95-124

96

BROCKER

striving for hegemony that was ultimately motivated by religi ous
grounds, saying
America bas for some considerable time shown a religious
tendency to divide the existing world into 'good' and 'evi l'
regions, nations or systems, as a consequence of its escbatological mission. America maintains this self-image across
the boundaries of all faiths and all religions, and perceives
the thousand-year kingdom of the Apocalypse of John that is
set to dawn with its experiment as the historico-theological
task of fighting evil on a mission of global politics, and
promoting freedom and progress throughout the world .
Since the end of the Cold War, this self-image has consolidated into a renewed striving for hegemony.

President Bush, continued Steinacker, pursues this route with
"enthusiastic support from the fundamentalism of evangelical
groups, principally in the South of the United States."2
These views were publicly affirmed by individual politicians
in the German Christian Democratic Union such as Heiner
Geissler, who described Bush as a "Christian Ayatollah." 3
These and other characterizations of the US President as a
"crusader" pursuing a "mission of salvation," were heard increasingly in Europe from representatives of the churches, politicians, and intellectuals during the war in Iraq. Bush's statements
are also occasionally interpreted thus in the US: In November
2003, Joan Didion published an essay in the New York Revie w of
Books claiming that the hidden agenda of Bush's policies can be
found in the apocalyptic "Left Behind" novels by Timothy La-

2

Steinacker, Peter. 2003 . "God's own country . Auch religiOse Differenzen verbreitern die
Kluft zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und Europa." Frankfurte r Rund schau online, January 21 .
3
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 February 2003, p. 6.
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Haye and Jerry B. Jenkins. 4 Didion and others impute a dimension to George W. Bush's policies (on Iraq) that is ultimately a
religious one and can be described as "fundamentalist." This essay examines the grounds for such evaluations against the backdrop of the special relationship between politics and religion in
the USA and the role played by the 'fundamentalist' "Christian
Right" in US domestic and foreign policy.
Patriotism and Missionary Zeal in the US
It was the Puritans, the first settlers in the early seventeenth
century, who originally furnished the Biblical rhetoric still used
today in the US to characterize the "American myth," and applied by Americans chiefly in times of crisis; America is described as the land of "hope" and "glory," as "God's own
country," for which everything will tum out well both now and
in the future (Bercovitch 1983).
To the colonists, the journey to America was neither emigration nor flight, but a "pilgrimage" and a prophetic event. Devout
Christians, called by God to a historic "mission," set out to found
the "city on the hill" on the shores of the New World. This rhetoric fulfilled the function of portraying the theft of the native Indian peoples' territory as nothing more than the appropriation of
land already promised, and of weakening the immigrants' ties of
genealogy and national history in favor of a specifically "American" identity. The settlers were no mere European emigrants, but
the New People of Israel, and America was not a European colony, but the Promised Land of Canaan. No underlings of an aristocracy, these free and equal citizens submitted only to the
authority of God; they were confident of God's mercy since he
4

Didion, Joan . "Mr . Bush and the Divine ." New York Review of Books 50/17, 6 November 2003. See also Jennifer Loven, "Bush Increasing Religious Allusions ," Associated
Press, 18 February 2003.
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demonstrably blessed their actions. They perceive d their venture
as an "errand into the wilderness," the fulfillment of the task of
establishing the ''New Jerusalem" in still "wild" and boundless
territory, that was interpreted from the outset as a moral and
spiritual , rather than a geographical, venture, a viewpoint that
simplified its cross-border scale: first America, later to be known
as the "United States," then the world.
In the nineteenth century, the "errand into the wilderness" became America's "manifest destiny," appointed by Providence "to
manifest to mankind the excellence of divine principles, to establish on earth the noblest temple ever dedicated to the worship of
the Most High-The Sacred and the True" (John L. O'Su llivan,
1839; quoted from Kuhnel 1996, 454). The ''New Nation" had
been entrusted with a superhistorical 'truth': the concepts of
' freedom' and 'self government,' upon the realization and implementation of which-according to the country's self-imagethe salvation of humanity depended. This idea initially furnished
legitimacy for the expansion westward, and subsequently-i n the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries-for American imperialism. The conviction of setting an example to the world
gave rise to the right, indeed the duty, to reshape that world in
compliance with this exemplary role. In his April 1917 declaration of war against Germany, President Woodrow Wilson j ustified the involvement as "an act of high principle and idealism"
and "a crusade to make the world safe for democracy."5 The
American understanding of freedom and democracy was if possible to be shared among all the peoples of the world . The original concept of a religious mission was thus transformed into a
missionary zeal for democracy.

5

Interesting parallels might be drawn between the foreign policies of Woodrow Wilson
and George W. Bush-a task, however, that cannot be undertaken here.
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Civil Religion
This having been said, we should not assume that early America was ruled by a homogeneous, or even monolithic, culture that
united its immigrants into a single nation. On the contrary, from
the outset American society was strongly fragmented (with respect to regional, ethnic, social, and religious differences), and
this fragmentation grew as the centuries passed. The ties that
bound this disparate society were initially comprised of a narrow
band of commercial exchange and the free traffic of goods,
which triggered a rapid rise in national income. However, a further and primary social tie was the conglomerate of ideas, attitudes, and behaviors so impressively described by Alexis de
Tocqueville at the start of the nineteenth century. Despite their
many differences, including religious ones, the inhabitants demonstrably shared a common 'doctrine,' known as "civil religion" or the "American creed" (Myrdal 1944, 3).
"Civil religion"6 is the term denoting a collection of beliefs,
symbols, and rituals that bind citizens to a political community
and ultimately permits the claim of religious legitimacy to be
raised by that community, its institutions, and representatives.
This collection of beliefs publicly identifies and acknowledges
within the political system those elements that in principle men
are not free to change. It also links the nation's history and its
destiny in a meaningful and publicly communicated relationship
(Ltibbe 1981, 56). Civil religion empowers citizens to view their
political community in a specific light, and articulates the vision
that unites the nation into an integrated whole (Pierard 1996,
158). It is concerned with the "civitas terrena," not the "civitas
dei" (Marty 1986). American civil religion thus stands not for
6

On (American) civil religion , see particularly: Bellah 1967; Richey/Jones 1974; Marty
1986; Wald 1997, 59-72; Maier 1998.
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diluted Puritanism or Protestantism, but for an independent consensus of values guaranteeing the solidarity and stability of its
highly disparate, strongly fragmented society-a task which no
one faith or religion could have fulfilled. If, say, Protestantism in
the eighteenth century had been granted legal privileges or even
been elevated to the status of national religion, sooner or later
this would have resulted in the breakdown of a society that increasingly numbered not only non-Protestants, non-Christians
and non-believers, but also hundreds of Protestant churches and
sects that would probably never have found a consensus over the
content of a common "national religion."
It is thus no coincidence that American civil religion adopts a
strict separation of church and state (Levy 1994), a stricter separation even than that found in Europe's most widely secularized
countries today. To this day, state aid for religions and favoritism
of a specific faith are prohibited by the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution which-according to the Supreme
Court's interpretation (Alley 1999, Hitchcock 2004)--prohibits
state institutions and representatives from financially supporting
churches and church organizations and publicly exhibiting religious symbols. After the Second World War in particular, this
constitutionally rooted stipulation of the separation of church and
state was enforced with increasing rigor as the number of religions and philosophies in the US grew-the result partly of immigration, partly of indigenous developments.
Linked to the strict separation of church and state is the guarantee of almost unlimited freedom to practice religion (Choper
1995; Hammond 1998), largely shielded from intervention by
state bodies-in the same way that the protection of personal
freedom is generally at the core of political concepts of order. A
basic element of American civil religion is that its citizens' scope
of freedom must be acknowledged and secured as far as possible,
and that the degree of success in fulfilling this task is the yardTHE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL
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stick by which the legitimacy of all exercise of state power is
measured. The American people's vibrant patriotism draws its
greatest strength not least from being at home in the "freest land
on earth" in which everyone can 'be happy according to his own
countenance.'
Ideas of civil religion are widespread among the American
people. In surveys, the majority regularly agrees with statements
such as "I consider holidays like the Fourth of July religious as
well as patriotic" and "We should respect the president's authority since his authority is from God" (Wimberley 1976; Wald
1997, 61; Wilcox 2000, 16-19).
American presidents make frequent reference in their
speeches to the specific world of ideas and symbols belonging to
American civil religion (Germino 1984; Lejon 1988). George
Washington already applied them when addressing the Congress
and the American people at his inauguration in 1789: ''No People
can be bound to acknowledge and adore the invisible hand,
which conducts the Affairs of men more than the People of the
United States. Every step, by which they have advanced to the
character of an independent nation, seems to have been distinguished by some token of providential agency" (Washington
1939, 293).
Such "sermons of civil religion" have frequently been held by
American presidents since Washington's time. Abraham Lincoln
and Ronald Reagan in particular were gifted "high priests" of the
"American creed." Ronald Reagan publicly expressed his conviction that the United States was a chosen nation singled out for
a specific mission: "We are a nation under God. I've always believed that this blessed land was set apart in a special way, that
some divine plan placed this great continent between the oceans"
(quoted from Lejon 1988, 80).
Terms such as "divine plan," "Providence" and "Creator" are
part of the standard rhetorical repertoire of American presidents,
VOL. 32 2004

102

BROCKER

who are regarded not only as "Head of State" and "Commander
in Chief," but also as the nation's "Chief Preacher," charged with
the task of spreading hope and confidence in times of crisis.
The "preaching" of the forty-third President of the United
States, George W. Bush, whose speeches are repeatedly peppered
with scraps of American "civil religion," is no exception. "Liberty is God's gift to every human being in the world ... We're
called to extend the promise of this country into the lives of
every citizen who lives here. We're called to defend our nation
and to lead the world to peace, and we will meet both challenges
with courage and with confidence" (Bush 2003a).
When Bush endeavors to speak words of comfort after tragic
events such as the attacks of September 11 or the Columbia
space shuttle disaster, he fuses secular and religious rhetoric into
a whole dominated by a metaphorical style that is active, futureoriented, and optimistic-in conformity with American civil religion. Disasters are ultimately only a "test" of America's "resolution" and "will" to proceed down its allotted path of "progress"
and "liberty." Strengthening "faith," they are at worst mere "setbacks" on the road to prosperity and "fortune," the price exacted
for scientific and technological triumph, for military victory, for
"liberty," etc. Almost every speech by Bush ends-also in accordance with tradition-with the statement "[May] God bless
America," expressing the hope and confidence that God's blessing rests on the United States.
Bush is thus merely continuing rhetorical tradition in his
speeches, which many European observers feel have an unusually strong "religious" tone. The majority of "religious" references and connotations in his current public speeches present
familiar civil religious ideas in more or less new combinations.
Bush invokes common values and proffers-in the manner of the
Roman Republic-the moral convictions of the nation's forefathers ("mos maiorurn") to mobilize support for political intenTHE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL
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tions.7 In this respect, his speeches and public addresses are not a
novel phenomenon.
European observers nevertheless claim that Bush differs from
his predecessors by using more religious references and Biblical
quotations than, say, his father George Herbert Walker Bush or
William Jefferson Clinton. They point out that Bush begins almost every working day in the White House with a Bible reading, opens his Cabinet meetings with a prayer, and frequently
invites members of the clergy to visit the White House. 8 When,
in the wake of the Columbia disaster at the beginning of February 2003, Bush addressed the shocked nation in a televised
speech and declared, "The same Creator who names the stars
also knows the names of the seven souls we mourn today,"9 following this by a direct quotation from the Book of Isaiah; critics
thought this an unusual move for an American president who
should represent all American people regardless of their creed. In
the aftermath of September 11 in particular, when his aim was to
put fresh heart into the nation and prepare it for the wars in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, Bush increasingly incorporated
"Christian" terms and ideas into his speeches. It was no coincidence, claim observers, that in his State of the Union address on
January 28, 2003, Bush justified a preventive strike against Iraq
by calling on the "loving God" in whom, as he said, the nation
placed its confidence in these "decisive days" more than ever. 10
He also referred to liberty as "God's gift to humanity," which the
7

Keller, Bill. 2003 . "Reagan ' s Son," New York Times Magazine (online), 26 January .
Dempsey, Judy . 2003 . "Solana fears widening gulf between EU and US." Financial
Times (online), 7 January . Rob, Matthias. 2003. "Der fromme Mann irn Wei6en Haus, "
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 January, p. 3.
9
Quoted from : Richard W . Stevenson, "Bush Leads Nation's Grieving ," New York Times
on the Web, 2 February 2003 .
10
Geyer, Christian . 2003 . "Zwei Stellvertreter Christi," Frankfurter Allg emeine Zeitung,
30 January, p. 33.
1
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American people desired to protect for all the peoples of the
world (Bush 2003b). A year before this, Bush had spoken of an
"axis of evil" (Bush 2002c), deliberately introducing a religiously charged expression in his use of the word "evil" that
helped to divide the world into "good" and "evil," "friends" and
"foes." Did not this choice of words-as the critics quoted earlier maintain---<iisclose the "Manichean" attitude of a closet
"fundamentalist"?
There is no doubt that since September 11, 2001, Bush's references to God have grown more frequent and more fervent
("loving God," "Lord Almighty," "Giver of life") than in previous months. The shock of the terrorist attacks on New York and
Washington hit the American people hard and drove many to
seek refuge in their faith. While it is possible that the President
also experienced an intensification of religious faith in the period
after September 11, 2001, social science cannot determine the
truth of that claim. However, the allegation must be examined
that Bush developed a "Christian missionary" view of politics
that increasingly colors his domestic and foreign policy. Admittedly, his speeches contain statements that could be interpreted as
having Christian Evangelical meanings, such as "the power of
faith can transform a life" or "it's so inspirational to see ... the
great works of our Lord in your heart" (Bush 2003a). Such
statements clearly overstep the normal level of "civil religion" in
Presidential speeches. However, should they really be read in the
light of the Protestant "fundamentalism" of which the President
stands accused by the critics mentioned? ls the domestic and foreign policy of the United States under George W. Bush shaped
by the programmatic positions of American "fundamentalists"?
Christian Protestant Fundamentalism in the US
The term "fundamentalism" originated-perhaps surprisingly
in view of current discussions concerning political developments
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL
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in Islamic societies-in the US, and denotes a Protestant reform
movement that arose at the end of the nineteenth and beginning
of the twentieth century. The name derived from the title of a 12volume series of publications that appeared between 1910 and
1915: The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth. The aim of
the work was to defend the ''true" faith against "new-fangled"
theological modernism,11 theological liberalism, 12 and "secularism" (Darwinism in particular), and also to warn against the
negative social and cultural changes they were assumed to
spawn.
In its initial stages, the new movement was principally supported by scholars in the urban centers of the North and recognized theological faculties such as Princeton Seminary. From the
1920s fundamentalism also spread among believers of lower
socio-economic classes in the South and Midwest.
Although initially the fundamentalists were still classified as
part of America's "mainstream," this was to change after the
"Monkey Trial." The American public reacted with consternation
to the fundamentalists' proc!amations of anti-rationalism ("We
study only the Bible") and "fanatical" criticism of modern natural sciences. As public attitudes became more negative, the fundamentalists responded by increasingly retreating into their
communities and cultivating an escapism that spumed the outside world. Many lived in anticipation of the end of the world
and the imminent Second Coming of Christ. Fundamentalists
began to found their own schools and colleges and expand their
11

A reference to the "Gennan," "Biblical" or "Higher Criticism " which had begun to
apply principles of textual criticism to the Bible as to any ancient document; consetVative
Protestants held the view that this called into question the divine inspiration and truth of
the Bible as an authoritative document of faith.
12
This referred chiefly to the "social gospel" movement, which in the view of conservative Protestants concentrated too much on social reforms and too little on moral and
pctsonal ljfc issues,.thus forgetting about "saving souls."
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religious organizations and institutions, in order to be capable of
sustaining and reproducing fundamentalist culture while shielded
from "modernity" (Bruce 1988, 30-31).
In the twentieth century, American Protestantism was not the
only religion to develop a progressively institutionalized, " fundamentalist'' wing. Studies conducted as part of the "Fundamentalism Project" of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences
(Marty and Appleby 1991-1995) show that almost all religions
(Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism etc.) developed fundamentalist movements during the twentieth century, whichdespite their many differences-had many elements in common.
According to Marty and Appleby (1991-1995, vol. 1, 835),
religious "fundamentalism" is an attitude within religious communities that manifests itself in the form of a strategy applied by
believers to preserve their distinct group identity when this is
perceived as being under threat. Identity is secured by the selective revival of certain "fundamental" dogmas, doctrines and
practices, by which believers aim to demarcate themselves from
the cultural milieu of the unconverted and "unredeemed," whom
they perceive as "enemies of God." Their objective is to "recreate" a hermetic world view that can be applied within a complete
cognitive explanation of the world as a whole, its nature, and its
history. The powerful attraction of fundamentalist movements is
drawn from their claim to absolute truth, conveying "ontological
security" in a world of pluralist claims to validity and lifestyles.
Their structure is generally authoritarian and their leadership
absolutist with a strong moral impetus (Bruce 2000).
Drawing the line between "fundamentalist" and "nonfundamentalist" movements within a religion can be difficult.
"Fundamentalists" are distinguished from "conservative," "traditionalist" or "orthodox" believers solely by their specific understanding of the common doctrines, particularly by the selection
and interpretation of those principles of faith regarded, and to be
THE -JOURNAL OF POLITICAL
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regarded, as "fundamental." In this connection, the supernatural
and eschatological elements of a religion are generally emphasized and linked to a dualistic Manichean interpretation of the
world. The meaning of history is projected onto a person (Hidden Imam, Christ, Messiah) or a tendency, at the appearance of
which "good" (''.justice") ultimately prevails at the end of time
and evil ("Satan") is swept away forever. The intensity of faith is
strengthened by repeated predictions that the "last days" will
dawn in the near future.
Despite the consequences they hold for society, fundamentalist movements are not necessarily political. Riesebrodt (1990)
joins Max Weber in distinguishing two forms of fundamentalism:
one of "ruling the world," responding to the conflict between
religious principles of orientation and a changing social environment by attempting to control reality, particularly by suppressing reality that differs from the norm; and one of "fleeing
from the world," an at least mental withdrawal from the world,
generally with cultish attributes. Only the first type has the potential for radical politicization.
American fundamentalism in the first half of the twentieth
century was a purely religious, largely apolitical movement with
strong escapist tendencies, expecting changes in those social
conditions designated as "sinful" to arise from the confessional
conversion of the individual to the Christian way of life and from
a retreat from the "secular world," or from the direct intervention
of Christ (chiliasm), but not as a result of social activism on the
part of the church, political participation, or intervention by the
(welfare) state. Attempts to politicize fundamentalism thus failed
repeatedly between the 1920s and 1960s, and not until the 1970s
did partial political mobilization of a "Christian Right" take
place, a reaction to growing protest activities by the liberal new
social movements, the "counter-culture," and the liberalization of
abortion law by the United States Supreme Court.
VOL. 32 2004
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The "Christian Right" and American Domestic Policy
A new phenomenon in the United States was the establishment of political organizations in conservative Protestantism
such as "Moral Majority," "Religious Roundtable," "Christian
Voice," and "Concerned Women for America" in the late 1970s
(Watson 1997; Wilcox 2000), which were founded by fundamentalist television and radio preachers (among them Jerry Falwell,
Timothy LaHaye, and James Robison). From the end of the
1980s these and other "Christian Right" organizations were increasingly joined by "neo-Evangelicals," "Pentecostals," and
"Charismatics" (here referred to by the generic term of "Evangelicals"), who do not share the full range of religious convictions of the Protestant "fundamentalists," but support their
political aims.
These political aims primarily constitute the implementation
of socio-moral and religio-political reforms such as the reinstatement of morning prayers in schools, addressing Biblical
creationism in biology lessons, and a strict ban on abortionsreforms intended to arrest or reverse the process of social modernization and socio-cultural liberalization that had been accelerating since the 1960s.
Surveys show that around 27% of the American population
can be categorized as Evangelical Protestants (around onequarter of whom, approximately 7% of the total population, are
Protestant "fundamentalists" in the strictest sense) (Wald 1997,
173). In surveys, Evangelicals claim more frequently than other
Protestants or Catholics that religion is an important area of orientation in their lives; they are more active in their church communities, attend services more frequently, and read the Bible
more often than other Christians (Wilcox 2000, 48-49).
On political issues, Evangelicals adopt considerably more
conservative positions than adherents of other religions, demonstrating extremely conservative attitudes to issues of religious
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL
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policy, and social and moral issues in particular. Surveys show
they are less willing to tolerate others with diverging values and
more likely to regard belief in God as an important prerequisite
for being a "good American." On issues of abortion, the role of
women in society and homosexual rights, the gap between Evangelicals and "mainline" Protestants, Catholics and those with no
religious affiliations is relatively wide, while differences are less
marked on economic questions (Wilcox 2000, 50-51).
While not all Evangelicals support or favor the organizations
of the "Christian Right" and their aims, around 14 to 17% of all
American voters can be classified as supporters of the "Christian
Right," voting almost exclusively for Republican candidates
(Green 2000a; Green 2000b; Wilcox 2002, 116-117).13 This is
the source of the significant influence exerted since the 1980s by
the "Christian Right" of the Republican Party. The "Christian
Right" thus associated its great hopes of a radical political
change and the realization of its catalog of political demands
with George W. Bush's assumption of office in January 2001.
In fact, Bush began to accommodate the expectations of the
"Christian Right" soon after his election. He reinstated the
"Mexico City Policy" canceling US financial aid for international family planning organizations that perform abortions,
which had been abolished by Clinton in 1993. He ordered a reappraisal of state subsidies for medical research institutes using
embryonic stem cells in their work. 14 He announced the introduction of education vouchers also redeemable at (Evangelical)
parochial schools. He proposed a future program of "faith-based
13
At the end of the I 990s, the number of activists was between 150,000 and 200,000 (cf.
Green 2000a : 8).
1
' On August 9, 2001, Bush decided to grant State aid only to research on existing stem
cell lines, a decision that provoked divided opinions on "Christian Right" sites, which
called for an end to federal funding .
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initiatives" (which later failed due to congressional opposition).
In addition, he publicly announced his support for morning
prayers in public schools, for abstinence education, and for a
constitutional amendment to ban same-sex-marriages, for the
prohibition of certain forms of late-term abortion, and the prohibition of therapeutic and reproductive cloning. He nominated
staunch opponents of Roe v. Wade as federal appellate judges.
Furthermore, he appointed a Pentecostal, John Ashcroft, former
Senator of Missouri, as Attorney General: Ashcroft's appointment in particular was to be understood as a quid pro quo for the
support of the "Christian Right" during the election, prompting
expectations for the future of closer cooperation between the
White House and the religio-conservative wing of the GOP on
issues of domestic policy.
However, for Bush the "Christian Right" is only one of several key blocks of voters. To secure reelection in 2004, he will
need to satisfy other voter groups in the Republican Party such
as the economic conservatives, who are more interested in reforms in economic, fiscal, and social policy. Since these voter
groups frequently also hold moderate or liberal views on sociomoral and religious policy issues, the President's scope for accommodating the demands of the "Christian Right" is strictly
curtailed. He will thus continue-while making smaller concessions on some socially less controversial issues-to temporize
and obfuscate on key issues for the "Christian Right," since
adopting over-definite positions would lose him votes from other
voting groups. Up to now, then, Bush has deliberately refrained
from launching initiatives to prohibit abortion by Constitutional
amendment or to ease the strict separation of church and state.
He is basically acting no differently from Ronald Reagan, who
supported individual initiatives by the "Christian Right" in the
1980s but invested little political capital in launching radical
changes. Reagan's verbal support of the aims of the "Christian
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Right" was largely motivated by election strategy, as was his
occasional use of evangelical-fundamentalist terms such as his
description of the Soviet Union as an "evil empire."
George W. Bush is following in the footsteps of Ronald
Reagan, whose successful reelection in 1984 was due not least to
support from this circle. Bush's constant reiteration that he grew
up in one of the Bible Belt states (although born in Connecticut),
converted to Methodism and was "born again," are all aimed at
increasing his credibility among conservative Protestants, whose
votes are vital in the 2004 Presidential elections to boost his
chances of success and prevent a repetition of the close call that
occurred in the year 2000.
This is why Bush is so definite in his use of the language of
Evangelicalism, referring to the "axis of evil," describing the
protection of freedom as the American "mission" or warning of
the dangers of a nuclear "Armageddon" (Bush 2002a). While as
a "born-again Christian" he may have a personal affinity with the
religio-theological positions of the spiritual leaders of the "Christian Right," from a political !)Ointof view his strategy is in the
main an attempt motivated by election tactics to integrate evangelical voters as fully as possible into the circle of regular Republican voters, by the use of rhetoric and token gestures over
issues of domestic policy. This is demonstrated not least by the
fact that the President tends to accommodate "Christian Right"
interests to a far lesser extent in matters of foreign policyseldom a critical factor in US election results.
The "Christian Right" and American Foreign Policy
During the twenty years and more of its existence, the demands of the "Christian Right" have primarily concerned domestic policy, only rarely taking a stance on foreign policy issues.
Even after the attacks of September 11, the movement's leaders
initially attempted to exploit events to galvanize domestic policy
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into action. Jerry Falwell, former spokesman of the "Mor al Majority ," stated in a television interview two days after the terrorist
attacks of September 11 that they had been caused by the wrath
of God, punishing the United States of America for its "sins" (i. e.,
homosexuality, abortion, and feminism). Yet his attempt to advertise the movement's own domestic policy agenda by applying
this interpretation misfired; massive public protests ensued and
Falwell was forced to apologize for his remarks. 15
However, when the United States launched military operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan, fundamentalist leaders
began to turn their attention towards foreign policy. Their propaganda now portrayed America-as in the times of the East-West
conflict-as the "last great home of faith" that had become the
target of "Satan." The Soviet Union was replaced by Islam(ism)
as the new "kingdom of evil." Their supporters gratefully seized
on the idea; Muslims had , after all, long been regarded as a threat
to the state of Israel, the existence of which plays an important
role in Protestant fundamentalist eschatology. 16
This new interpretation of the "fight of good against evil" resulted in unequivocally clear propaganda: "Muhammad was a
demon-possessed pedophile," declared Jerry Vines, an expresident of the Southern Baptist Convention. "Islam is a very
evil and wicked religion," announced Franklin Graham, son of
15

Carlson, Peter . 2001. "Jerry Falwell ' s Awkward Apology," Washington Post, 18 November, FI .
16
For fundamentalists Israel, said to be the location of"Annageddon," will be the site of
the "last great battle" against the Anti-Christ. The foundation of the state of Israel in
1948, and the conquest of Jerusalem by Israeli troops in the Six Days' War, are regarded
by Evangelical premillenialists as a "sign " of the imminent fulfillment of Biblical prophecies . They have thus demanded for years that the state of Israel be defended by all means
and Jerusalem recognized as part of Israeli territory . But their most recent demand is the
destruction of "ungodly Babylon" from which-according to their interpretation of the
Scriptures-the Anti-Christ will extend his rule. Babylon is sited in today's Iraq, and was
rebuilt only a few years ago under Saddam Hussein .
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Billy Graham (NBC Nightly News, November 16, 2001). "Islam
seeks to destroy others" stated Marion "Pat" Robertson, founder
of the "Christian Coalition," 17 who said elsewhere that Mohammed "was an absolute wild-eyed fanatic. He was a robber and a
brigand ... to think that this is a peaceful religion is fraudulent." 18
"Adolf Hitler was bad," he continued, "but what the Muslims
want to do to the Jews is worse." 19
When the "Christian Coalition," the largest organization of
the "Christian Right" with 1.5 million members, organized a
symposium in Washington in February 2003 on the theme "Muslims and The Judeo-Christian World-Where to From Here?," at
which-as critics pointed out-not a single Muslim was invited
to speak,20 the hostility to Islam inherent to the event was clearly
revealed in the choice of topics: "War on Iraq," "Christian Persecution in Arab Countries," and "Islam and Terrorism." Another
objective of the event, according to information given by the organizers, was to inform American Christians about the "true"in other words, the violent, anti-Christian-"nature oflslam."
The "Christian Coalition" had sent a questionnaire to its
members prior to the conference to investigate their attitude toward Islam. Almost 90% of those participating in this online survey (n=955) shared the view that Islam was not a "religion of
peace;" 91.5% believed that Islam was not a "Godly religion"
17

Quoted from Susan Sachs, "Baptist Pastor Attacks Islam, Inciting Cries of Intolerance," New York Times on the Web, 15 June 2002 .
18
Thus Marion "Pat" Robertson in the TV show "Hannity & Colmes,» Fox News Channel; quoted here from a press release of the Muslim Amen ·can Society dated IO October
2002.
19
Quoted from Dana Milbank, "Hawks Chide Bush over Islam," Washington Post
(online), 2 December 2002.
20
Interfaith Alliance President Says Upcoming Christian Coalition Forum Raises Serious
Questions About its Spirit and Purpose. Interfaith Alliance Press Release, 12 February
2003; http://www.interfaithalliance .org/press/.
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and 96% believed that Christians were discriminated against in
Islamic societies-unlike Muslims in Christian societies. 21 With
an eye to the Iraq crisis , the survey revealed that 75% were in
favor of war against Saddam Hussein-twenty percentage points
more than in the population as a whole at that time (Szukala/Jager 2003, 44) .
Although Iraq policies delivered such definite support for the
President's position, there are no grounds for concluding that
George W. Bush would pursue the religiously colored world
view and apocalyptic prophecies of a Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell, and their ilk, or align his foreign policy to such views. On
the contrary, Bush explicitly distanced himself several times
from their tirades against Islam, earning their harsh criticism in
retum .22
Bush's statements were marked by his attempt to achieve four
different goals: (1) avoid alienating his Evangelical voters while
maintaining a tone of moderation; (2) by doing this, to prevent
the development of pan-Islamic solidarity with the Taliban,
Osama Bin Laden, and Saddam Hussein after the invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq; (3) attempt to forge a broadly based war
and anti-terrorism coalition to include moderate Islamic states
(Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait etc.; but also Pakistan and Uzbekistan , for example, with regard to the war in Afghanistan); (4)
ensure that, despite his bellicose rhetoric, no danger would ensue
for the Muslim minority in his own country. Of the four to six
million Muslims in the US, not a few had been the victims of

21

However, 77% of the survey's participants openly admitted to knowing "little" or
"nothing" about Islam: Christian Coalition Releases Survey Results on Islam. Press Release, January 17, 2003 : http ://cc.org/becomeinfonned/pressreJeaseOJ 1703.html .
22
"Bush Steps Away From Christian Fundamentalists ' Comments on Islam" In Ethics
Daily.com, November 15, 2002; httpJ/www.ethicsdaily.com/article_detail.cfm?A.ID=l8J2.
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verbal or physical attacks after September 11, and at least three
had been murdered.23
In his addresses, Bush consistently omitted all expressions associated with the "clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1996) that
would only have played into the hands of Islamic (and Protestant) fundamentalists and provoked a "clash within civilizations"
at home. He did all he could to present the fight against al-Qaeda
and the Taliban as a "battle against international terrorism"-an
anti-religious, because inhuman, movement-and backed up his
verbal articulation of this stance with symbolic acts of state: After September 11, multi-denominational services were held in
New York, attended by a phalanx of non-Christian clergy and
religious scholars (including those of Jewish, Islamic, and Hindu
origins), at which George W. Bush's 'sermons' were invariably
from the mold of civil, not denominational religion.24
Statements by the President that transparently served the
needs of his own Evangelical voters ("axis of evil" etc.) remained the exception. The central, reiterated concepts addressed
in his speeches were "terrorism," not "religion," "al-Qaeda" and
"the Taliban regime," not "Islam," and "lasting freedom," not
"global peace"-which, like "infinite justice," could have been
interpreted in a Christian missionary light. "The terrorists,"
stated Bush,
practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim
clerics-a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam .... Islam's teachings are good and peaceful,
and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme
the name of Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own
faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself .. .. They are the
23

24

Silk, Mark . 2002. "Our Muslim Neighbors," Religion in the News, 513: I, 22.
Silk, Mark. 2001 . "The Civil Religion Goes to War," Religion in the News, 4/3 : I .
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heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century ... they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and
totalitarianism (Bush 2001).

Behind this carefully chosen rhetoric was the US government's realization that Huntington's theory of an imminent
"clash of civilizations," which has been adopted by American
(and Islamic) fundamentalists as a confirmation of their Manichean world view, can easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy
as a result of the government's own words and deeds.
George W. Bush's Foreign Policy and the Iraq Conflict
The foreign policy of Bush's government is influenced not by
representatives of the "fundamentalist" "Christian Right" but by
neo- and standard conservative advisers that, like Rumsfeld,
Cheney, Rice, Wolfowitz and Perle, had already served under
earlier Republican presidents (Bush, Ford, and Reagan). None is
a Protestant fundamentalist or Evangelical. Attorney General
John Ashcroft, an avowed supporter of the "Christian Right," has
no perceptible influence on the formulation of US foreign policy.
The attitude of the President's foreign policy advisers is
shaped by a deep distrust of international organizations such as
the United Nations and a profoundly skeptical view of multilateral action that could curtail American sovereignty or potentially
damage American (security) interests.
While these views are represented in part by the "Christian
Right," they are primarily shared by conservative think tanks in
particular (such as the American Enterprise Institute and the
Center for Security Policy), as well as other security policy advisers and Republican senators. Current United States' foreign
and security policies are formulated against a backdrop of (neo-)
conservative convictions, not Christian fundamentalist dogmas.
However, European critics in particular cling to the conviction that the "preventive strike" against Iraq, a controversial
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move in terms of both morality and international law, was ultimately religiously motivated and demonstrated belief in a "mission." After all, Bush himself had described the US's God-given
mission as being "to defend our nation and lead the world to
peace" (Bush 2003a), exhibiting-according to one German
journalist-the nature of salvation: "The ambition to protect that
Bush expresses is one of totality, encompassing, so to speak, the
evil of all generations. Though the Kingdom of God has not yet
materialized, yet it has dawned at that time in 2003 when a lone
president takes the evil of the world upon himself and, acting as
25
others' proxy, comes, sees and conquers. "
It is certainly correct that in the weeks leading up to the war
against Iraq, Bush increasingly applied the rhetoric of (civil!)
religion, with the aim of mobilizing support for his cause at
home. However, there are no grounds for the proposition that his
motives for planning the invasion were specifically denominational Christian, given the array of realpolitik-related reasons
from the US point of view which advocated military intervention
in Iraq (Pollack 2002). As early as October 7, 2002, President
Bush had stated
Some believe we can address this danger by simply resuming the old approach to inspections, and applying diplomatic
and economic pressure. Yet this is precisely what the world
has tried to do since 1991. The UN inspections program was
met with systematic deception. The Iraqi regime bugged hotel rooms and offices of inspectors to find where they were
going next; they forged documents, destroyed evidence, and
developed mobile weapons facilities to keep a step ahead of
inspectors (Bush 2002b).

25

Geyer, Christian . 2003. "Zwei Stellvertreter Christi," Frankforter Allgemeine Zeitung,
30 January, p. 33.
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At the start of 2003, the US government claimed that Iraq had
failed to fulfill Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002, in addition to 16 earlier resolutions, and that Iraq had evaded sanctions
imposed on it, used bogus companies to procure material for its
weapons program and financed the material with illegal oil revenues that it had boosted from 500 million dollars to three billion
dollars within only a few years. 26 The government also claimed
that Iraq had failed to meet its obligations to disarm and to disclose data concerning its arsenals of biological and chemical
weapons of mass destruction and their stockpile locations; that it
had attempted to develop nuclear weapons; that it possessed missile systems exceeding 150 km in range, also expressly forbidden
by UN resolution (Resolution 687); furthermore, the claims continued, links between Iraq and the al-Qaeda terrorist network
existed which-as Colin Powell declared before the UN security
council-were said to have been established by Abu Mussab alZarqawi . There was a danger that Iraq could supply terrorist
networks with biological or chemical war substances such as
anthrax, botulin, ricin or VX nerve gas (already used once by
Saddam Hussein against Iran and his own Kurdish populati on).
The Bush administration considered these grounds sufficient
to justify a military strike against Iraq and effect a regime
change. Any attempt to read further "intrinsic" factors such as
religious motives ("Protestant fundamentalism") into its conclusion must-as this analysis has shown-be rejected as pure
speculation. While motives of "civil religion" are involved in the
question of the legitimacy of the Iraq war and its "aftermath," the
principal aim behind the persistent affirmation of wanting to help
the repressed Iraqi people topple a tyrannical regime and introduce "freedom" and "democracy" was to mobilize support in
26
Rice, Condoleezza. 2003. "Ein Konsens zum Stillhalten ist fllr uns nicht akzeptabel."
Frankfort er Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 February, p. 3.
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Bush's own country (since Vietnam, the United States has obviously been unable to wage war without gaining public support).
But a distinction must be drawn between this rhetoric of "civil
religion" and the rhetoric of denominational religion. Unlike the
latter, the former generated a self-imposed political obligation to
arrange for the rebuilding of the country and democratic order
after the successful conclusion of the Iraq war, regardless of the
cost and duration of the undertaking. The Bush government has
no choice but to permit itself to be judged by this implicit obligation-particularly at home-since the Iraq war is over. The vast
scale of the task is likely to prove a tough test of the United
States' "missionary zeal" for democracy.
CONCLUSION

To many observers, the forty-third President of the US,
George W. Bush, appears more religious than his predecessors.
While this may be true for him as an individual, his policies
show no such influence by personal religious beliefs. Like his
role model Ronald Reagan, Bush is first and foremost a political
"professional," and is advised by political "professionals" such
as Karl Rove, the election strategist. Bush seeks to win the support of as many societal groups in the US as possible, not least
with a view to securing his reelection in 2004. To do this, he requires the support of the "Christian Right" wing of his own
party, among others (but by no means exclusively). He thus accommodates the domestic policy demands issued by this wing, at
least where he can do this without losing the support of other
voting blocs, and therefore occasionally takes over the rhetorical
terminology of Evangelicals, particularly when speaking before
an Evangelical audience. Bush's statements quoted at the beginning, "the power of faith can transform a life" or "it's so inspirational to see . .. the great works of our Lord in your heart" (Bush
2003a) were made to the "National Religious Broadcasters," an
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organization of Evangelical radio and TV broadcasters in the
USA that plays a key role as disseminator in Bush's election
strategy. Reagan also adopted this style of speaking at the beginning of the 1980s whenever he appeared at the organization's
conferences.
However, the "Christian Right" plays no role in the formulation of foreign policy, in which the government's actions are influenced by (neo-) conservative advisers, whose viewpoints and
objectives reveal motives of security policy, strategy and economics, but not religion. No other interpretation of the President's statements and speeches is possible. Bush's choice of
religious metaphors remains in the category of American "civil
religion," expressing a commitment to the ideals of democracy
and human rights-intended
to derive their effectiveness not
from the use of force and hegemonial expansion, but from their
own role model. Even under Bush, American politics has not
adopted the tenor of using military methods to export the country's own social model throughout the world: "America has no
empire to extend or utopia to establish," declared Bush in 2002
to the cadets of West Point Military Academy (Bush 2002a).
The foreign policy of George W. Bush, then, is less concerned
with a change of direction motivated by religion (or even Christianity) than with a stricter perception of American (security)
interests prompted by the events of September 11, and a stronger
articulation of the ideas and "beliefs" of "civil religion": "We
have no intention of imposing our culture-but America will
always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for
women, private property, free speech, equal justice, and religious
tolerance" (Bush 2002c ). Historically, these "beliefs" of civil
religion that oblige every political order to protect peace and
freedom and guarantee equal opportunity, the rule of law and
democracy, have primarily served to determine the moral yardTHE JOURNAL
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stick by which the citizens of the United States can gauge the
legitimacy of their own government's political actions-and pronounce judgment on Election Day.
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